Look up A, AAAA, CNAME, MX, TXT, NS, SOA, SRV and CAA records for any domain. Parses SPF and DMARC, detects your providers and grades DNS health.
Enter a domain and this DNS lookup tool queries nine record types at once — A, AAAA, CNAME, MX, TXT, NS, SOA, SRV and CAA — and returns the values, the TTLs and a plain-English reading of what they mean. It goes further than a raw dig dump: it parses your SPF and DMARC records, identifies which DNS provider and which email provider you are actually using, and scores the domain’s DNS configuration out of 100 with a letter grade and a list of specific fixes.
It is built for the people who spend their week in DNS: sysadmins moving a domain to a new host, email admins chasing a deliverability problem, security teams checking whether a domain has CAA records before a certificate issue, and web developers who need to know whether a change has actually taken effect. Queries run over DNS-over-HTTPS against Cloudflare’s public resolver, so results reflect a real public recursive resolver rather than whatever your laptop happens to have cached.
| Type | Purpose | Example value |
|---|---|---|
| A | Maps a hostname to an IPv4 address. The record that makes a website reachable. | 93.184.216.34 |
| AAAA | Maps a hostname to an IPv6 address. Increasingly expected; its absence is a real gap on modern networks. | 2606:2800:220:1::1946 |
| CNAME | Aliases one name to another. Cannot coexist with other records at the same name, which is why you cannot put a CNAME at the zone apex. | www → example.com |
| MX | Names the mail servers for the domain, each with a priority. Lower numbers are tried first. | 10 mail.example.com |
| TXT | Free-form text. In practice this is where SPF, DKIM, DMARC and domain-ownership verification tokens live. | v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com ~all |
| NS | The authoritative nameservers for the zone. These decide who is allowed to answer for the domain. | ns1.example-dns.com |
| SOA | Start of Authority: the primary nameserver, the responsible mailbox, the zone serial number and the negative-caching TTL. | ns1.example.com. hostmaster.example.com. 2026081201 … |
| SRV | Locates a service by protocol and port — used heavily by SIP, XMPP, Kerberos and Active Directory. | _sip._tcp 10 60 5060 sipserver.example.com |
| CAA | Declares which certificate authorities may issue certificates for the domain. A cheap, high-value control. | 0 issue "letsencrypt.org" |
One record type deliberately sits outside this list: PTR. A PTR record maps an IP address back to a name, and it lives in the reverse zone (in-addr.arpa for IPv4, ip6.arpa for IPv6) rather than in your domain’s forward zone. It is normally controlled by whoever owns the IP block — your hosting provider or ISP — not by you, which is why a forward lookup on a domain name never returns one. It matters most for outbound email: many receiving servers reject or penalise mail from an IP with no PTR, or with a PTR that does not match the sending hostname.
https://example.com/page resolves as example.com.All three email-authentication mechanisms are published as TXT records, and the tool parses them rather than just printing them. An SPF record such as v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com ip4:203.0.113.10 ~all is broken into its mechanisms — which senders are authorised — and its qualifier. The final term matters most:
-all (hard fail) — anything not listed is unauthorised. The correct end state.~all (soft fail) — treat unlisted senders with suspicion but still accept. A reasonable place to sit during rollout.?all (neutral) or +all — effectively no policy. +all authorises the entire internet to send as you; it is always a misconfiguration.SPF also has a hard limit of ten DNS-resolving mechanisms (include, a, mx, ptr, exists, redirect). Exceed it and the record returns permerror, which many receivers treat as no SPF at all. The ptr mechanism is deprecated and should be removed wherever you find it.
DMARC lives at _dmarc.yourdomain.com and ties SPF and DKIM results to the visible From address through alignment. Its policy tag runs p=none (monitor only) → p=quarantine → p=reject. Publishing p=none with an rua= reporting address is the correct first step; leaving it there permanently is the most common half-finished email-security project in existence. If you need to build or repair these records, the SPF record generator and DMARC record generator produce syntactically valid records for you.
DNS has no push mechanism, so nothing actually propagates. What happens is simpler and more predictable: every record carries a TTL in seconds, and any resolver that has already answered for that name will keep serving its cached copy until the TTL expires. When people say a change is “still propagating”, what they mean is that caches populated before the change have not yet aged out.
The practical consequence is that you control your own migration window in advance. Lower the TTL on the records you are about to change to 300 seconds, wait for the old TTL to fully elapse so every cache holds the short value, then make the change — and the world follows within five minutes. Do it in the other order and you wait out the old TTL regardless.
Two other caching behaviours catch people out. Negative answers (NXDOMAIN) are cached too, governed by the minimum field in the SOA record, so a name you query before creating it may appear missing for a while afterwards. And some resolvers and operating systems clamp or ignore very low TTLs, so five minutes is a floor rather than a guarantee.
Very long TTLs earn a warning in the health score for exactly this reason: a 24-hour TTL is fine on a stable NS record and a liability on an A record you may need to move in an emergency.
An authoritative answer comes from a nameserver listed in the domain’s NS records — the server that holds the zone. A cached (non-authoritative) answer comes from a recursive resolver repeating something it learned earlier. This tool queries a public recursive resolver, so its answers are recursive, and the TTL shown is the remaining lifetime in that resolver’s cache rather than the full configured value. A TTL of 3600 on one lookup and 2841 thirty seconds later on the next is the cache counting down, not a configuration change.
To read the value straight from the source, query an authoritative nameserver directly: dig @ns1.example.com example.com A. The reply will lack the ra flag and carry aa (authoritative answer), and the TTL will be the full configured value every time. Comparing an authoritative answer against a recursive one is the definitive way to tell “my change is not live” from “my change is live but still cached somewhere”.
Pair a DNS lookup with the WHOIS lookup to see registration and registrar detail, the SSL certificate checker to confirm the certificate served at the address the A record points to, and the subnet calculator when you are working out which network an answer belongs to.
A, AAAA, CNAME, MX, TXT, NS, SOA, SRV and CAA. You can select a subset if you only want specific types.
Either it has not been saved at the authoritative nameserver, or a resolver is still serving a cached answer or a cached NXDOMAIN. Query your authoritative nameserver directly to tell the two apart — if the record is there, it is a caching delay and it will clear when the TTL expires.
No — this is a forward lookup on a domain name, and PTR records live in the reverse in-addr.arpa zone controlled by whoever owns the IP address. Ask your hosting provider or ISP to set or correct one.
3600 seconds (one hour) is a sensible default for A, AAAA, CNAME and MX records. Use 300 seconds during a planned migration, and 86400 for records that essentially never change. Set the short TTL at least one old-TTL period before you need it.
You should not. A domain may publish only one v=spf1 TXT record; two produce a permanent error and receivers may ignore SPF entirely. Merge them into a single record by combining the include: mechanisms, keeping the total resolving lookups at ten or fewer.
They are not required, but they are cheap insurance. A CAA record tells every public certificate authority which of them may issue for your domain, so a mis-issuance attempt through a CA you do not use is refused at the source. One line such as 0 issue "letsencrypt.org" is enough to start.
Concrete configuration facts, not opinion: presence of A and AAAA records, MX configuration and redundancy, SPF, DKIM and DMARC presence, CAA records, TTL sanity, and whether the domain has at least two nameservers. Each contributes to a score out of 100 which maps to an A–F grade, and each deduction comes with the specific recommendation that would fix it.
Provider detection reads the NS records for DNS and the MX records for email, then matches them against known hostname patterns. If your mail routes through a security gateway, the MX will show the gateway; the tool then checks DKIM selectors and SPF includes to infer the mailbox provider sitting behind it. A resold or white-labelled service can surface as the underlying vendor.
Not in standard DNS. A CNAME must be the only record at its name, and the apex necessarily carries SOA and NS records. Providers work around this with ALIAS, ANAME or CNAME-flattening records that resolve the target server-side and answer with an A record.
The domain you enter is sent to a public DNS-over-HTTPS resolver to answer the query — that is unavoidable for any DNS tool. Nothing is stored on our side, and results are not associated with you.
Look up all DNS record types for any domain—A, AAAA, MX, TXT, CNAME, NS, SOA, and more. Essential for troubleshooting email delivery and domain configuration.
Verify your SPF, DKIM, and DMARC records are correctly configured to prevent email spoofing and improve deliverability.
Email authentication is critical for protecting your domain from spoofing and phishing attacks. Three key protocols work together to verify email legitimacy:
SPF records specify which mail servers are authorized to send email on behalf of your domain. When a recipient server receives an email claiming to be from your domain, it checks your SPF record to verify the sending server is authorized.
A typical SPF record might look like:
v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com include:spf.protection.outlook.com ~all
This example authorizes Google and Microsoft mail servers while using a "soft fail" (~all) for unauthorized senders.
DKIM adds a digital signature to email headers, allowing receiving mail servers to verify that the email wasn't altered in transit. It uses public-key cryptography, with the public key published in your DNS records.
A DKIM record contains:
DMARC builds on SPF and DKIM, enabling you to specify what actions should be taken when authentication fails. You can set policies ranging from monitoring-only (p=none) to quarantine or rejection.
A strong DMARC policy example:
v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc@example.com; pct=100
This tells recipient servers to reject emails that fail authentication and send aggregate reports to your monitoring address.
Modern DNS lookup tools provide sophisticated capabilities beyond basic record queries:
DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) cryptographically authenticate DNS responses to prevent spoofing and cache poisoning attacks. When enabled, DNSSEC ensures the DNS records you receive are genuinely from the authoritative nameserver and haven't been tampered with during transmission.
DNSSEC uses a chain of trust:
Advanced DNS tools can scan multiple subdomains (often 20+) to discover SSL/TLS certificates and identify expiration issues before they cause service disruptions. This is crucial for:
When you update DNS records, changes don't take effect instantly worldwide. Propagation analysis queries multiple DNS servers (typically 8+ major providers) across different geographic regions to verify your records have propagated correctly.
This helps you:
DNS lookup and email security checks are essential for various scenarios:
When your emails aren't reaching recipients, DNS records are often the culprit. Check for:
Regular DNS audits help identify security gaps:
When migrating between email providers (e.g., from Gmail to Microsoft 365), DNS verification is critical:
Proactive DNS monitoring helps maintain your domain reputation:
Pro Tip: Set up automated DNS monitoring to receive alerts when records change unexpectedly or certificates are approaching expiration. This proactive approach prevents many common issues before they impact your users.
DNS lookup translates domain names to IP addresses, enabling browsers to locate websites. It's essential for troubleshooting connectivity issues, verifying mail server configurations (MX records), validating domain ownership (TXT records), and ensuring proper DNS propagation after changes. Network administrators use it daily for diagnostics and configuration verification.
Common DNS records include: A (IPv4 address), AAAA (IPv6 address), MX (mail server), CNAME (alias), TXT (text/verification), NS (nameserver), SOA (zone authority), PTR (reverse lookup), and SRV (service location). Each serves specific purposes in routing traffic, email delivery, domain verification, and service discovery across the internet.
DNS propagation typically takes 24-48 hours globally, though local changes may appear within minutes. The delay depends on TTL (Time To Live) values set on records, ISP caching policies, and geographic distribution. Lower TTL values (e.g., 300 seconds) speed up propagation but increase DNS query load on authoritative nameservers.
Authoritative DNS servers store actual DNS records for domains they manage and provide definitive answers. Recursive DNS servers (resolvers) query authoritative servers on behalf of clients, caching results to improve performance. ISPs and public services like Google (8.8.8.8) and Cloudflare (1.1.1.1) operate recursive resolvers for end users.
Check if the domain exists, verify nameserver configuration, test with multiple DNS servers (8.8.8.8, 1.1.1.1), clear local DNS cache (ipconfig /flushdns on Windows, sudo dscacheutil -flushcache on Mac), check for DNSSEC validation errors, verify firewall rules allow port 53, and use tools like nslookup or dig for detailed diagnostics.
TXT records store text data for domain verification (Google Search Console, SSL certificates), email authentication (SPF, DKIM, DMARC), site ownership validation, and configuration information. They're critical for email security, preventing spoofing, and proving domain control for third-party services. Each TXT record can contain up to 255 characters per string.
DNS caching causes temporary inconsistencies. Each resolver caches records based on TTL values, so recent changes may not appear everywhere immediately. Geographic DNS (GeoDNS) also provides different answers based on query location. Additionally, some ISPs filter or redirect DNS queries, and DNS hijacking or poisoning can return incorrect results.
DNSSEC (DNS Security Extensions) adds cryptographic signatures to DNS records, preventing cache poisoning and man-in-the-middle attacks. It verifies authenticity of DNS responses but requires proper configuration. Enable DNSSEC if your registrar and DNS provider support it, especially for high-security domains, though it adds complexity to DNS management and troubleshooting.