CWE-114: Process Control

Extended Description

Process control vulnerabilities take two forms: An attacker can change the command that the program executes: the attacker explicitly controls what the command is. An attacker can change the environment in which the command executes: the attacker implicitly controls what the command means. Process control vulnerabilities of the first type occur when either data enters the application from an untrusted source and the data is used as part of a string representing a command that is executed by the application. By executing the command, the application gives an attacker a privilege or capability that the attacker would not otherwise have.

Code Examples & CVEs

Demonstrative Examples

The following code uses System.loadLibrary() to load code from a native library named library.dll, which is normally found in a standard system directory.

The problem here is that System.loadLibrary() accepts a library name, not a path, for the library to be loaded. From the Java 1.4.2 API documentation this function behaves as follows [1]: A file containing native code is loaded from the local file system from a place where library files are conventionally obtained. The details of this process are implementation-dependent. The mapping from a library name to a specific filename is done in a system-specific manner. If an attacker is able to place a malicious copy of library.dll higher in the search order than file the application intends to load, then the application will load the malicious copy instead of the intended file. Because of the nature of the application, it runs with elevated privileges, which means the contents of the attacker's library.dll will now be run with elevated privileges, possibly giving them complete control of the system.

BadJava

...System.loadLibrary("library.dll");...

The following code from a privileged application uses a registry entry to determine the directory in which it is installed and loads a library file based on a relative path from the specified directory.

The code in this example allows an attacker to load an arbitrary library, from which code will be executed with the elevated privilege of the application, by modifying a registry key to specify a different path containing a malicious version of INITLIB. Because the program does not validate the value read from the environment, if an attacker can control the value of APPHOME, they can fool the application into running malicious code.

BadC

...RegQueryValueEx(hkey, "APPHOME",0, 0, (BYTE*)home, &size);char* lib=(char*)malloc(strlen(home)+strlen(INITLIB));if (lib) {                                                     strcpy(lib,home);strcat(lib,INITCMD);LoadLibrary(lib);                      }...

The following code is from a web-based administration utility that allows users access to an interface through which they can update their profile on the system. The utility makes use of a library named liberty.dll, which is normally found in a standard system directory.

The problem is that the program does not specify an absolute path for liberty.dll. If an attacker is able to place a malicious library named liberty.dll higher in the search order than file the application intends to load, then the application will load the malicious copy instead of the intended file. Because of the nature of the application, it runs with elevated privileges, which means the contents of the attacker's liberty.dll will now be run with elevated privileges, possibly giving the attacker complete control of the system. The type of attack seen in this example is made possible because of the search order used by LoadLibrary() when an absolute path is not specified. If the current directory is searched before system directories, as was the case up until the most recent versions of Windows, then this type of attack becomes trivial if the attacker can execute the program locally. The search order is operating system version dependent, and is controlled on newer operating systems by the value of the registry key: HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\SafeDllSearchMode

BadC

LoadLibrary("liberty.dll");

Source-backed guidance

Additional facts reviewed against primary or authoritative security sources.

Verify controls for CWE-114 with SSDF evidence

Use NIST SSDF verification and vulnerability-response practices to detect CWE-114, Process Control, throughout the product lifecycle. Derive review questions, static or dynamic checks, and negative tests from the CWE's causal behavior; define the components and lifecycle stages each check covers; and retain findings with enough evidence to distinguish the root cause from symptoms and impacts. Track escapes and false negatives, then improve the verification plan after every confirmed occurrence.

NIST SP 800-218 Secure Software Development Framework — National Institute of Standards and Technology

Apply Libraries or Frameworks controls for Process Control

MITRE associates mitigation with Architecture and Design; the listed strategies include Libraries or Frameworks; documented detection approaches include Automated Static Analysis. Use these source-defined anchors to turn CWE-114 into implementation, review, and verification checks for the affected component.

CWE-114: Process Control — MITRE CWE

Triage CWE-114 against known exploitation evidence

Use CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog to test whether a vulnerability mapped to CWE-114, Process Control, has evidence of exploitation in the wild. Confirm the CVE-to-CWE root-cause mapping independently before attaching the example, then capture the affected product, required action, and remediation deadline. A missing KEV match is not evidence that the weakness is unexploited, and a KEV entry must not be generalized to every occurrence of this CWE.

Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog — Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency

Apply precise root-cause mapping to CWE-114

Apply MITRE's full root-cause mapping guidance when using CWE-114, Process Control. Separate weakness language from attacker prerequisites and technical impact, check the entry's abstraction and vulnerability-mapping notes, and prefer the most specific Base or Variant supported by the evidence. Record the rejected alternatives and require an independent review before the mapping is used for remediation trends or program metrics.

CVE to CWE Root Cause Mapping Guidance — MITRE CWE

Validate CWE-114 with root-cause mapping checks

Apply MITRE's root-cause mapping quick tips to CWE-114, Process Control. Confirm the finding describes the causal weakness rather than an impact or attack pattern, compare the abstraction and mapping notes with plausible alternatives, and have a second reviewer challenge the selection. Preserve the evidence and reasoning so recurring defects can be measured against one consistent identifier.

CVE to CWE Root Cause Mapping Quick Tips — MITRE CWE

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CWE-114: Process Control?+

CWE-114: Process Control is a Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) entry maintained by MITRE. Executing commands or loading libraries from an untrusted source or in an untrusted environment can cause an application to execute malicious commands (and payloads) on behalf of an attacker. Process control vulnerabilities take two forms: An attacker can change the command that the program executes: the attacker explicitly controls what the command is. An attacker can change the environment in which the command executes: the attacker implicitly controls what the command means. Process control vulnerabilities of the first type occur when either data enters the application from an untrusted source and the data is used as part of a string representing a command that is executed by the application. By executing the command, the application gives an attacker a privilege or capability that the attacker would not otherwise have.

What are the security consequences of Process Control?+

If exploited, CWE-114 (Process Control) it can compromise Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability, leading to outcomes such as Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands.

How do you prevent or mitigate Process Control?+

Recommended mitigations for CWE-114 include: Libraries that are loaded should be well understood and come from a trusted source. The application can execute code contained in the native libraries, which often contain calls that are susceptible to other security problems, such as buffer overflows or command injection. All native libraries should be validated to determine if the application requires the use of the library. It is very difficult to determine what these native libraries actually do, and the potential for malicious code is high. In addition, the potential for an inadvertent mistake in these native libraries is also high, as many are written in C or C++ and may be susceptible to buffer overflow or race condition problems. To help prevent buffer overflow attacks, validate all input to native calls for content and length. If the native library does not come from a trusted source, review the source code of the library. The library should be built from the reviewed source before using it.

Which programming languages are affected by Process Control?+

CWE-114 commonly affects Not Language-Specific. Note that weaknesses are often language-agnostic patterns, so secure coding practices apply broadly.

What is the difference between a CWE and a CVE?+

A CWE (Common Weakness Enumeration) like CWE-114 describes a category of software weakness — the underlying flaw type. A CVE (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures) identifies a specific, real-world vulnerability in a particular product. In short, a CWE is the kind of mistake, and a CVE is an instance of that mistake being found in software.

CWE-114: Process Control

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