Consider the following code segment:
The programmer expects that when fgets() returns, buf will contain a null-terminated string of length 9 or less. But if an I/O error occurs, fgets() will not null-terminate buf. Furthermore, if the end of the file is reached before any characters are read, fgets() returns without writing anything to buf. In both of these situations, fgets() signals that something unusual has happened by returning NULL, but in this code, the warning will not be noticed. The lack of a null terminator in buf can result in a buffer overflow in the subsequent call to strcpy().
BadC
char buf[10], cp_buf[10];fgets(buf, 10, stdin);strcpy(cp_buf, buf);
In the following example, it is possible to request that memcpy move a much larger segment of memory than assumed:
If returnChunkSize() happens to encounter an error it will return -1. Notice that the return value is not checked before the memcpy operation (CWE-252), so -1 can be passed as the size argument to memcpy() (CWE-805). Because memcpy() assumes that the value is unsigned, it will be interpreted as MAXINT-1 (CWE-195), and therefore will copy far more memory than is likely available to the destination buffer (CWE-787, CWE-788).
BadC
int returnChunkSize(void *) { /* if chunk info is valid, return the size of usable memory, * else, return -1 to indicate an error */ ... }int main() {...memcpy(destBuf, srcBuf, (returnChunkSize(destBuf)-1));...}
The following code does not check to see if memory allocation succeeded before attempting to use the pointer returned by malloc().
The traditional defense of this coding error is: "If my program runs out of memory, it will fail. It doesn't matter whether I handle the error or allow the program to die with a segmentation fault when it tries to dereference the null pointer." This argument ignores three important considerations:
BadC
buf = (char*) malloc(req_size);strncpy(buf, xfer, req_size);
The following examples read a file into a byte array.
The code loops through a set of users, reading a private data file for each user. The programmer assumes that the files are always 1 kilobyte in size and therefore ignores the return value from Read(). If an attacker can create a smaller file, the program will recycle the remainder of the data from the previous user and treat it as though it belongs to the attacker.
BadC#
char[] byteArray = new char[1024];for (IEnumerator i=users.GetEnumerator(); i.MoveNext() ;i.Current()) {String userName = (String) i.Current();String pFileName = PFILE_ROOT + "/" + userName;StreamReader sr = new StreamReader(pFileName);sr.Read(byteArray,0,1024);//the file is always 1k bytessr.Close();processPFile(userName, byteArray);}
The following examples read a file into a byte array.
The code loops through a set of users, reading a private data file for each user. The programmer assumes that the files are always 1 kilobyte in size and therefore ignores the return value from Read(). If an attacker can create a smaller file, the program will recycle the remainder of the data from the previous user and treat it as though it belongs to the attacker.
BadJava
FileInputStream fis;byte[] byteArray = new byte[1024];for (Iterator i=users.iterator(); i.hasNext();) { String userName = (String) i.next();String pFileName = PFILE_ROOT + "/" + userName;FileInputStream fis = new FileInputStream(pFileName);fis.read(byteArray); // the file is always 1k bytesfis.close();processPFile(userName, byteArray);
The following code does not check to see if the string returned by getParameter() is null before calling the member function compareTo(), potentially causing a NULL dereference.
The following code does not check to see if the string returned by the Item property is null before calling the member function Equals(), potentially causing a NULL dereference.
BadJava
String itemName = request.getParameter(ITEM_NAME);if (itemName.compareTo(IMPORTANT_ITEM) == 0) {...}...
The following code does not check to see if the string returned by getParameter() is null before calling the member function compareTo(), potentially causing a NULL dereference.
The following code does not check to see if the string returned by the Item property is null before calling the member function Equals(), potentially causing a NULL dereference.
BadJava
String itemName = request.Item(ITEM_NAME);if (itemName.Equals(IMPORTANT_ITEM)) {...}...
The following code shows a system property that is set to null and later dereferenced by a programmer who mistakenly assumes it will always be defined.
The traditional defense of this coding error is: "I know the requested value will always exist because.... If it does not exist, the program cannot perform the desired behavior so it doesn't matter whether I handle the error or allow the program to die dereferencing a null value." But attackers are skilled at finding unexpected paths through programs, particularly when exceptions are involved.
BadJava
System.clearProperty("os.name");...String os = System.getProperty("os.name");if (os.equalsIgnoreCase("Windows 95")) System.out.println("Not supported");
The following VB.NET code does not check to make sure that it has read 50 bytes from myfile.txt. This can cause DoDangerousOperation() to operate on an unexpected value.
In .NET, it is not uncommon for programmers to misunderstand Read() and related methods that are part of many System.IO classes. The stream and reader classes do not consider it to be unusual or exceptional if only a small amount of data becomes available. These classes simply add the small amount of data to the return buffer, and set the return value to the number of bytes or characters read. There is no guarantee that the amount of data returned is equal to the amount of data requested.
BadC#
Dim MyFile As New FileStream("myfile.txt", FileMode.Open, FileAccess.Read, FileShare.Read)Dim MyArray(50) As ByteMyFile.Read(MyArray, 0, 50)DoDangerousOperation(MyArray(20))
This example takes an IP address from a user, verifies that it is well formed and then looks up the hostname and copies it into a buffer.
If an attacker provides an address that appears to be well-formed, but the address does not resolve to a hostname, then the call to gethostbyaddr() will return NULL. Since the code does not check the return value from gethostbyaddr (CWE-252), a NULL pointer dereference (CWE-476) would then occur in the call to strcpy().
BadC
void host_lookup(char *user_supplied_addr){ struct hostent *hp;in_addr_t *addr;char hostname[64];in_addr_t inet_addr(const char *cp); /*routine that ensures user_supplied_addr is in the right format for conversion */ validate_addr_form(user_supplied_addr);addr = inet_addr(user_supplied_addr);hp = gethostbyaddr( addr, sizeof(struct in_addr), AF_INET);strcpy(hostname, hp->h_name); }
The following function attempts to acquire a lock in order to perform operations on a shared resource.
However, the code does not check the value returned by pthread_mutex_lock() for errors. If pthread_mutex_lock() cannot acquire the mutex for any reason, the function may introduce a race condition into the program and result in undefined behavior.
BadC
void f(pthread_mutex_t *mutex) { pthread_mutex_lock(mutex); /* access shared resource */ pthread_mutex_unlock(mutex); }
The following function attempts to acquire a lock in order to perform operations on a shared resource.
However, the code does not check the value returned by pthread_mutex_lock() for errors. If pthread_mutex_lock() cannot acquire the mutex for any reason, the function may introduce a race condition into the program and result in undefined behavior.
GoodC
int f(pthread_mutex_t *mutex) { int result; result = pthread_mutex_lock(mutex);if (0 != result)return result; /* access shared resource */ return pthread_mutex_unlock(mutex); }