CWE-364: Signal Handler Race Condition

BaseIncompleteExploit Likelihood: Medium

The product uses a signal handler that introduces a race condition.

View on MITRE
Back to CWE Lookup

Extended Description

Race conditions frequently occur in signal handlers, since signal handlers support asynchronous actions. These race conditions have a variety of root causes and symptoms. Attackers may be able to exploit a signal handler race condition to cause the product state to be corrupted, possibly leading to a denial of service or even code execution. These issues occur when non-reentrant functions, or state-sensitive actions occur in the signal handler, where they may be called at any time. These behaviors can violate assumptions being made by the "regular" code that is interrupted, or by other signal handlers that may also be invoked. If these functions are called at an inopportune moment - such as while a non-reentrant function is already running - memory corruption could occur that may be exploitable for code execution. Another signal race condition commonly found occurs when free is called within a signal handler, resulting in a double free and therefore a write-what-where condition. Even if a given pointer is set to NULL after it has been freed, a race condition still exists between the time the memory was freed and the pointer was set to NULL. This is especially problematic if the same signal handler has been set for more than one signal -- since it means that the signal handler itself may be reentered. There are several known behaviors related to signal handlers that have received the label of "signal handler race condition": Shared state (e.g. global data or static variables) that are accessible to both a signal handler and "regular" code Shared state between a signal handler and other signal handlers Use of non-reentrant functionality within a signal handler - which generally implies that shared state is being used. For example, malloc() and free() are non-reentrant because they may use global or static data structures for managing memory, and they are indirectly used by innocent-seeming functions such as syslog(); these functions could be exploited for memory corruption and, possibly, code execution. Association of the same signal handler function with multiple signals - which might imply shared state, since the same code and resources are accessed. For example, this can be a source of double-free and use-after-free weaknesses. Use of setjmp and longjmp, or other mechanisms that prevent a signal handler from returning control back to the original functionality While not technically a race condition, some signal handlers are designed to be called at most once, and being called more than once can introduce security problems, even when there are not any concurrent calls to the signal handler. This can be a source of double-free and use-after-free weaknesses. Signal handler vulnerabilities are often classified based on the absence of a specific protection mechanism, although this style of classification is discouraged in CWE because programmers often have a choice of several different mechanisms for addressing the weakness. Such protection mechanisms may preserve exclusivity of access to the shared resource, and behavioral atomicity for the relevant code: Avoiding shared state Using synchronization in the signal handler Using synchronization in the regular code Disabling or masking other signals, which provides atomicity (which effectively ensures exclusivity)

Technical Details

Structure
Simple
Vulnerability Mapping
ALLOWED

Applicable To

Languages
CC++
Platforms

Source-backed guidance

Additional facts reviewed against primary or authoritative security sources.

Verify controls for CWE-364 with SSDF evidence

Use NIST SSDF verification and vulnerability-response practices to detect CWE-364, Signal Handler Race Condition, throughout the product lifecycle. Derive review questions, static or dynamic checks, and negative tests from the CWE's causal behavior; define the components and lifecycle stages each check covers; and retain findings with enough evidence to distinguish the root cause from symptoms and impacts. Track escapes and false negatives, then improve the verification plan after every confirmed occurrence.

NIST SP 800-218 Secure Software Development FrameworkNational Institute of Standards and Technology

Apply Language Selection controls for Signal Handler Race Condition

MITRE associates mitigation with Requirements, Architecture and Design, and Implementation; the listed strategies include Language Selection; documented detection approaches include Automated Static Analysis. Use these source-defined anchors to turn CWE-364 into implementation, review, and verification checks for the affected component.

CWE-364: Signal Handler Race ConditionMITRE CWE

Triage CWE-364 against known exploitation evidence

Use CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog to test whether a vulnerability mapped to CWE-364, Signal Handler Race Condition, has evidence of exploitation in the wild. Confirm the CVE-to-CWE root-cause mapping independently before attaching the example, then capture the affected product, required action, and remediation deadline. A missing KEV match is not evidence that the weakness is unexploited, and a KEV entry must not be generalized to every occurrence of this CWE.

Known Exploited Vulnerabilities CatalogCybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency

Apply precise root-cause mapping to CWE-364

Apply MITRE's full root-cause mapping guidance when using CWE-364, Signal Handler Race Condition. Separate weakness language from attacker prerequisites and technical impact, check the entry's abstraction and vulnerability-mapping notes, and prefer the most specific Base or Variant supported by the evidence. Record the rejected alternatives and require an independent review before the mapping is used for remediation trends or program metrics.

CVE to CWE Root Cause Mapping GuidanceMITRE CWE

Validate CWE-364 with root-cause mapping checks

Apply MITRE's root-cause mapping quick tips to CWE-364, Signal Handler Race Condition. Confirm the finding describes the causal weakness rather than an impact or attack pattern, compare the abstraction and mapping notes with plausible alternatives, and have a second reviewer challenge the selection. Preserve the evidence and reasoning so recurring defects can be measured against one consistent identifier.

CVE to CWE Root Cause Mapping Quick TipsMITRE CWE

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CWE-364: Signal Handler Race Condition?+

CWE-364: Signal Handler Race Condition is a Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) entry maintained by MITRE. The product uses a signal handler that introduces a race condition. Race conditions frequently occur in signal handlers, since signal handlers support asynchronous actions. These race conditions have a variety of root causes and symptoms. Attackers may be able to exploit a signal handler race condition to cause the product state to be corrupted, possibly leading to a denial of service or even code execution. These issues occur when non-reentrant functions, or state-sensitive actions occur in the signal handler, where they may be called at any time. These behaviors can violate assumptions being made by the "regular" code that is interrupted, or by other signal handlers that may also be invoked. If these functions are called at an inopportune moment - such as while a non-reentrant function is already running - memory corruption could occur that may be exploitable for code execution. Another signal race condition commonly found occurs when free is called within a signal handler, resulting in a double free and therefore a write-what-where condition. Even if a given pointer is set to NULL after it has been freed, a race condition still exists between the time the memory was freed and the pointer was set to NULL. This is especially problematic if the same signal handler has been set for more than one signal -- since it means that the signal handler itself may be reentered. There are several known behaviors related to signal handlers that have received the label of "signal handler race condition": Shared state (e.g. global data or static variables) that are accessible to both a signal handler and "regular" code Shared state between a signal handler and other signal handlers Use of non-reentrant functionality within a signal handler - which generally implies that shared state is being used. For example, malloc() and free() are non-reentrant because they may use global or static data structures for managing memory, and they are indirectly used by innocent-seeming functions such as syslog(); these functions could be exploited for memory corruption and, possibly, code execution. Association of the same signal handler function with multiple signals - which might imply shared state, since the same code and resources are accessed. For example, this can be a source of double-free and use-after-free weaknesses. Use of setjmp and longjmp, or other mechanisms that prevent a signal handler from returning control back to the original functionality While not technically a race condition, some signal handlers are designed to be called at most once, and being called more than once can introduce security problems, even when there are not any concurrent calls to the signal handler. This can be a source of double-free and use-after-free weaknesses. Signal handler vulnerabilities are often classified based on the absence of a specific protection mechanism, although this style of classification is discouraged in CWE because programmers often have a choice of several different mechanisms for addressing the weakness. Such protection mechanisms may preserve exclusivity of access to the shared resource, and behavioral atomicity for the relevant code: Avoiding shared state Using synchronization in the signal handler Using synchronization in the regular code Disabling or masking other signals, which provides atomicity (which effectively ensures exclusivity)

What are the security consequences of Signal Handler Race Condition?+

If exploited, CWE-364 (Signal Handler Race Condition) it can compromise Integrity, Confidentiality, Availability and Access Control, leading to outcomes such as Modify Application Data, Modify Memory, DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart, Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands and Gain Privileges or Assume Identity.

How do you prevent or mitigate Signal Handler Race Condition?+

Recommended mitigations for CWE-364 include: Design signal handlers to only set flags, rather than perform complex functionality. These flags can then be checked and acted upon within the main program loop. Only use reentrant functions within signal handlers. Also, use validation to ensure that state is consistent while performing asynchronous actions that affect the state of execution.

Which programming languages are affected by Signal Handler Race Condition?+

CWE-364 commonly affects C and C++. Note that weaknesses are often language-agnostic patterns, so secure coding practices apply broadly.

What are real-world examples of Signal Handler Race Condition?+

MITRE documents real CVEs mapped to CWE-364, including CVE-1999-0035, CVE-2001-0905, CVE-2001-1349, CVE-2004-0794 and CVE-2004-2259. You can look up the full details of each CVE, including CVSS scores and remediation guidance, on our CVE Lookup tool.

What is the difference between a CWE and a CVE?+

A CWE (Common Weakness Enumeration) like CWE-364 describes a category of software weakness — the underlying flaw type. A CVE (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures) identifies a specific, real-world vulnerability in a particular product. In short, a CWE is the kind of mistake, and a CVE is an instance of that mistake being found in software.

Learn More

Advertisement