CWE-1292: Incorrect Conversion of Security Identifiers

Extended Description

In a System-On-Chip (SoC), various integrated circuits and hardware engines generate transactions such as to access (reads/writes) assets or perform certain actions (e.g., reset, fetch, compute, etc.). Among various types of message information, a typical transaction is comprised of source identity (to identify the originator of the transaction) and a destination identity (to route the transaction to the respective entity). Sometimes the transactions are qualified with a security identifier. This security identifier helps the destination agent decide on the set of allowed actions (e.g., access an asset for read and writes). A typical bus connects several leader and follower agents. Some follower agents implement bus protocols differently from leader agents. A protocol conversion happens at a bridge to seamlessly connect different protocols on the bus. One example is a system that implements a leader with the Advanced High-performance Bus (AHB) protocol and a follower with the Open-Core Protocol (OCP). A bridge AHB-to-OCP is needed to translate the transaction from one form to the other. A common weakness that can exist in this scenario is that this conversion between protocols is implemented incorrectly, whereupon an untrusted agent may gain unauthorized access to an asset.

Code Examples & CVEs

Demonstrative Examples

Consider a system that supports AHB. Let us assume we have a follower agent that only understands OCP. To connect this follower to the leader, a bridge is introduced, i.e., AHB to OCP. The follower has assets to protect accesses from untrusted leaders, and it employs access controls based on policy, (e.g., AES-Key registers for encryption or decryption). The key is 128 bits implemented as a set of four 32-bit registers. The key registers are assets, and register AES_KEY_ACCESS_POLICY is defined to provide the necessary access controls. The AES_KEY_ACCESS_POLICY access-policy register defines which agents with a security identifier in the transaction can access the AES-key registers. The implemented AES_KEY_ACCESS_POLICY has 4 bits where each bit when "Set" allows access to the AES-Key registers to the corresponding agent that has the security identifier. The other bits from 31 through 4 are reserved and not used. Register Field Description AES_ENC_DEC_KEY_0 AES key [0:31] for encryption or decryption Default 0x00000000 AES_ENC_DEC_KEY_1 AES key [32:63] for encryption or decryption Default 0x00000000 AES_ENC_DEC_KEY_2 AES key [64:95] for encryption or decryption Default 0x00000000 AES_ENC_DEC_KEY_3 AES key [96:127] for encryption or decryption Default 0x00000000 AES_KEY_ACCESS_POLICY [31:4] Default 0x000000 [3:0] - 0x02 agent with Security Identifier "1" has access to AES_ENC_DEC_KEY_0 through AES_ENC_DEC_KEY_4 registers During conversion of the AHB-to-OCP transaction, the security identifier information must be preserved and passed on to the follower correctly.

Because of the incorrect conversion, the security identifier information is either lost or could be modified in such a way that an untrusted leader can access the AES-Key registers.

BadOther

In AHB-to-OCP bridge, the security identifier information conversion is done incorrectly.

Because of the incorrect conversion, the security identifier information is either lost or could be modified in such a way that an untrusted leader can access the AES-Key registers.

GoodOther

The conversion of the signals from one protocol (AHB) to another (OCP) must be done while preserving the security identifier correctly.

Source-backed guidance

Additional facts reviewed against primary or authoritative security sources.

Verify controls for CWE-1292 with SSDF evidence

Use NIST SSDF verification and vulnerability-response practices to detect CWE-1292, Incorrect Conversion of Security Identifiers, throughout the product lifecycle. Derive review questions, static or dynamic checks, and negative tests from the CWE's causal behavior; define the components and lifecycle stages each check covers; and retain findings with enough evidence to distinguish the root cause from symptoms and impacts. Track escapes and false negatives, then improve the verification plan after every confirmed occurrence.

NIST SP 800-218 Secure Software Development Framework — National Institute of Standards and Technology

Address Incorrect Conversion of Security Identifiers during Architecture and Design

MITRE associates mitigation with Architecture and Design, and Implementation; recorded impacts include Modify Memory, Read Memory, DoS: Resource Consumption (Other), Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands, and Gain Privileges or Assume Identity; related weaknesses include CWE-284, and CWE-1294. Use these source-defined anchors to turn CWE-1292 into implementation, review, and verification checks for the affected component.

CWE-1292: Incorrect Conversion of Security Identifiers — MITRE CWE

Triage CWE-1292 against known exploitation evidence

Use CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog to test whether a vulnerability mapped to CWE-1292, Incorrect Conversion of Security Identifiers, has evidence of exploitation in the wild. Confirm the CVE-to-CWE root-cause mapping independently before attaching the example, then capture the affected product, required action, and remediation deadline. A missing KEV match is not evidence that the weakness is unexploited, and a KEV entry must not be generalized to every occurrence of this CWE.

Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog — Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency

Apply precise root-cause mapping to CWE-1292

Apply MITRE's full root-cause mapping guidance when using CWE-1292, Incorrect Conversion of Security Identifiers. Separate weakness language from attacker prerequisites and technical impact, check the entry's abstraction and vulnerability-mapping notes, and prefer the most specific Base or Variant supported by the evidence. Record the rejected alternatives and require an independent review before the mapping is used for remediation trends or program metrics.

CVE to CWE Root Cause Mapping Guidance — MITRE CWE

Validate CWE-1292 with root-cause mapping checks

Apply MITRE's root-cause mapping quick tips to CWE-1292, Incorrect Conversion of Security Identifiers. Confirm the finding describes the causal weakness rather than an impact or attack pattern, compare the abstraction and mapping notes with plausible alternatives, and have a second reviewer challenge the selection. Preserve the evidence and reasoning so recurring defects can be measured against one consistent identifier.

CVE to CWE Root Cause Mapping Quick Tips — MITRE CWE

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CWE-1292: Incorrect Conversion of Security Identifiers?+

CWE-1292: Incorrect Conversion of Security Identifiers is a Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) entry maintained by MITRE. The product implements a conversion mechanism to map certain bus-transaction signals to security identifiers. However, if the conversion is incorrectly implemented, untrusted agents can gain unauthorized access to the asset. In a System-On-Chip (SoC), various integrated circuits and hardware engines generate transactions such as to access (reads/writes) assets or perform certain actions (e.g., reset, fetch, compute, etc.). Among various types of message information, a typical transaction is comprised of source identity (to identify the originator of the transaction) and a destination identity (to route the transaction to the respective entity). Sometimes the transactions are qualified with a security identifier. This security identifier helps the destination agent decide on the set of allowed actions (e.g., access an asset for read and writes). A typical bus connects several leader and follower agents. Some follower agents implement bus protocols differently from leader agents. A protocol conversion happens at a bridge to seamlessly connect different protocols on the bus. One example is a system that implements a leader with the Advanced High-performance Bus (AHB) protocol and a follower with the Open-Core Protocol (OCP). A bridge AHB-to-OCP is needed to translate the transaction from one form to the other. A common weakness that can exist in this scenario is that this conversion between protocols is implemented incorrectly, whereupon an untrusted agent may gain unauthorized access to an asset.

What are the security consequences of Incorrect Conversion of Security Identifiers?+

If exploited, CWE-1292 (Incorrect Conversion of Security Identifiers) it can compromise Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability and Access Control, leading to outcomes such as Modify Memory, Read Memory, DoS: Resource Consumption (Other), Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands, Gain Privileges or Assume Identity and Quality Degradation.

How do you prevent or mitigate Incorrect Conversion of Security Identifiers?+

Recommended mitigations for CWE-1292 include: Security identifier decoders must be reviewed for design inconsistency and common weaknesses. Access and programming flows must be tested in pre-silicon and post-silicon testing.

Which programming languages are affected by Incorrect Conversion of Security Identifiers?+

CWE-1292 commonly affects Not Language-Specific. Note that weaknesses are often language-agnostic patterns, so secure coding practices apply broadly.

What is the difference between a CWE and a CVE?+

A CWE (Common Weakness Enumeration) like CWE-1292 describes a category of software weakness — the underlying flaw type. A CVE (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures) identifies a specific, real-world vulnerability in a particular product. In short, a CWE is the kind of mistake, and a CVE is an instance of that mistake being found in software.

CWE-1292: Incorrect Conversion of Security Identifiers

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